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Studies on the calibration of subjective probabilities find that people tend to 
over-estimate the precision of their knowledge. In this paper we develop a 
semi-rational model and apply it to the real estate markets in Hong Kong 
and other Asian countries. The key point is that a person is rational about 
her/his private information until her/his private information is confirmed by a 
clearly defined market signal. Using a pre-sale as a mechanism of 
updating a developer's beliefs, this paper analyzes the impact  of over-
confidence on overbuilding and cycles in real estate markets. Our finding 
indicates that a pre-sale activity will increase the magnitude of over-building 
and over-confidence will increase the volatility in real estate markets. Our 
model also has implications to the well-established literature dealing with 
the issue of over-capacity in many industrial sectors.  
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In the past, researchers who model real estate markets normally assume that 
market participants are completely rational when making investment decisions. 
However, the empirical literature in the psychology field reports that people 
are not always rational. They not only are over-confident about the precision 
of their private information, but also update their information on the accuracy 
of their private information in a biased manner. The evidence from the 
psychology literature casts some doubt on the reasonableness and 
robustness of the assumption that investors are completely rational. 
 
Prior to 1990, most researchers in the finance field also assume that investors 
in the financial market are completely rational when modelling financial 
behavior. Recently, however, it has become increasingly difficult for the 
rational models to explain why returns in the financial market tend to exhibit 
momentum and reversals. In recent years, several finance researchers begin to 
relax the assumption that investors are completely rational. By incorporating 
the  findings from the psychology field, they assume that investors are 
rational in all aspects except that they might be over-confident about their 
own private information. Research along this line of thought has produced 
fruitful results and is able to explain the observed momentum trading and 
market under- and over-reactions. (For a list of recent articles on these issues, 
see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Odean (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), 
and Lee and Swaminathan (2000).)  
 
In this paper, we investigate the implications of over-confidence in the real 
estate market. The model we develop is sort of a "semi-rational model" in the 
sense that the developer is rational except when her/his private information is 
confirmed by a clearly defined market activity. When a developer's private 
information is confirmed, our model assumes that the developer will become 
irrational and rely more on her/his private information in making investment 
decisions.  
 
Our model is developed using the unique pre-sale system prevailing in Asian 
real estate markets as the framework. In other words, we treat the pre-sale 
activity as a way for a developer to confirm her/his private belief. If the pre-
sale level conforms to a developer's original belief, then the developer will Over-Confidence and Cycles in Real Estate Markets 95 
 
become over-confident about her/his ability to estimate future demand level. 
Otherwise, the developer will behave rationally. With the pre-sale system and 
over-confidence on the developer's part, we show that the real estate market 
will become more over-supplied and have a more prominent real estate cycle. 
The results of our model confirm the stylized facts that cities in Asian 
countries tend to have higher vacancy rates and longer real estate cycles 
than cities in North America and other parts of the world.  
 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. In the next 
section, we will describe briefly the pre-sale system prevailing in Asian cities.  
The following section contains our model development, in which the decision 
making process is divided into three phases. We will show how over-
confidence can be developed in these 3 phases. We then apply our model to 
explain the real estate cycles and over-building in Asian real estate markets.  
The last section contains our conclusions. 
 
 
Pre-sale Activities in Hong Kong 
   
In many Asian countries, developers are allowed to sell residential units of 
their development projects prior to the completion. Buyers of the property will 
begin to make payments immediately after signing the purchase contract. This 
method allows buyers to secure the right to purchase a property and possess 
ownership upon making the final payments (usually at the time the building is 
completed), thus reducing the uncertainty on the availability and the price 
level of future properties. On the other hand, developers will be able to 
receive income prior to the completion of the project, thus reducing the risks 
associated with the long investment horizon of the property development.  
 
The rules and regulations governing the pre-sale activities vary among Asian 
countries. In some places, pre-sale begins before construction is actually 
started. Developers can decide whether to continue or to terminate the 
development project based on the number of buyers in the pre-sale. While in 
other countries (such as Hong Kong), pre-sale is allowed only when the 
development is in progress or is almost completed.  
   
In Hong Kong, developers need to obtain consent of pre-sale before they can 
conduct a pre-sale. The consent of pre-sale is usually granted 20 months 
before the estimated date of completion. Within six months after obtaining 
permission for sale, a developer can start selling the units through internal 
sales and/or public sales. Although regulations change over time, in general 
developers are required to put on to the market no less than a certain 96  Wang, Zhou, Chan and Chau 
   
percentage (say 20%) of the units approved for presale in each batch of 
public sale. Hong Kong developers normally offer numerous payment options 
to buyers. The down payment of a flat can range from 10% to 100% of the 
flat's purchase price. 
   
The existence of pre-sale offers developers an alternative source of financing 
their projects. The source of financing is normally quite important. This is true 
because, depending on the sizes and backgrounds of the developers, long- or 
short-term construction loans can be very small and limited, if available. In 
addition, the risk of holding completed units is effectively reduced through 
presales. This is especially important in cities with many large-scale 
developments (such as Hong Kong), where the development of one project 
will create a one-time substantial increase in supply in the residential market.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine another important aspect of the pre-
sale system. That is, developers can actually use the pre-sale system as an 
information-gathering tool. To start a development process, because of 
construction lag, developers will have to estimate the future demand to make 
a construction decision today. In Hong Kong and many Asian countries 
where large-scale developments are common, the forecasted demand level is 
particularly important in decision making as the development phase (and 
hence the construction lag) will normally be longer than in cities in other 
regions (such as North America or Europe).  
 
It is convincing to argue that the pre-sale system can serve as an information 
gathering system for developers. In a large development with many phases, 
developers will have the freedom to decide the timing of the phases of the 
project. In other words, a developer can launch a pre-sale, and if the result is 
good, the developer can speed up her/his development plan. (This means an 
increase in supply in the market.) If the pre-sale result is not as good as the 
developer originally expected, the developer could revise the estimate of 
future demand and slow down the development process. (This means a 
decrease in supply in the market.) A similar argument can be applied to 
developments of relatively small scale. Even if there is only one development 
phase, the developer can still control the speed of the construction.  In other 
words, developers of smaller projects can still use the trial-sale information to 
adjust the speed of supply. 
 
Asian real estate markets are known for their high vacancy rates and long 
lasting real estate cycles. To give a few examples, table 1 and table 2 of Lai 
and Wang (1999) illustrate the volatile patterns of the price movement and 
new units supplied in Hong Kong during the 1973-1997 period.  The popular 
press also notes that the price level of Hong Kong properties in 2001 is about Over-Confidence and Cycles in Real Estate Markets 97 
 
50% to 60% lower than the price level in 1997. Similarly, the popular press 
reports that the vacancy rate of residential units in Taiwan is around 10%, a 
rate much higher than that observed in the United States. The price and 
volume movements in some China cities (such as Shanghai) are believed to be 
even more volatile than in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
 
With the pre-sale system as an information-gathering tool, this paper shows 
that development volatility should be amplified if developers are over-
confident about their own estimates of the market demand. In other words, 
the paper attempts to analyze a unique institutional feature i n Asian real 
estate markets to provide one more possible explanation for the long standing 
puzzle on real estate over-supply and cycle.  Since throughout the paper we 
will use the pre-sale system as an information-gathering tool, we will term it 





We assume that there is a single developer and there are d
~customers, each 
with the same given reservation price P. The customers are ready to purchase 
one unit of product at a price that is equal to or smaller than P. We assume 
that the developer is risk-neutral. Let c be the construction cost per unit and 
X be the number of supplied units. (Naturally, we assume that P > c.) We also 
assume that there are two types of information in the market: public 
information and private information. The public information is available to all 
participants in the market. However, only the developer possesses private 
information.  
 
There are three periods in our model: period 1(date 0), trial-sale period, and 
the final phase. In period 1 (date 0), the developer observes both the public 
information as well as receives her/his own private information. Based on the 
public and private information received, the developer will form her/his belief 
about the demand in the market at the final phase. After the belief is formed, 
the developer will decide an amount for a trial-sale in period two. At this stage, 
we assume that the developer is rational in her/his estimation and does not 
place excess weight on the private information she/he possesses. 
 
The information received from the trial-sale (period 2), however, will change 
the developer's estimate of demand. It is this part that we assume the 
developer might behave irrationally. That is, if the developer's private 
information is confirmed by the pre-sale, then the developer will put more 98  Wang, Zhou, Chan and Chau 
   
weight on her/his private information when estimating the total demand and 
deciding the number of units to build in the final phase (period 3). 
 
To begin, we assume that there are two states for the demand: dH and dL (dH > 
dL) with probabilities p and 1-p, respectively. The parameters d ~, P, dH, dL, and 
p are all public information. The expected demand for the period is E (d) = p dH 
+ (1-p) dL. At date 0, the developer receives both the public information on 
the distribution of the demand (such as E (d) = p dH + (1-p) dL) as well as 
her/his own private information. The developer might receive two types of 
mutually exclusive private information: one positive signal ( G) or one 
negative signal (B) about the future demand.  
 
The positive private signal (G) indicates that dH will be the future demand.  
However, the developer also realizes that this positive private signal might 
not be accurate and therefore, assigns a probability a that the private signal 
might be inaccurate. Similarly, a negative private information (B) indicates that 
dL will be the future demand, with a probability ß that the signal could be 
wrong. In this regard, a can be interpreted as the probability that the positive 
private signal (G) will not be realized and ß is the probability that the negative 




) ( < = H d B p a   and   .
2
1
) ( < = L d G p b            (1) 
 
We specify  a <   ½ and  ß  < ½ to indicate that the developer's private 
information is informative. (If a = ß = ½, then the private signal contains no 
information.) Let y be the number of units supplied by the developer. When 
the developer is risk-neutral, the profit function II is 
If  ] , [ L H d d y˛ , then 
 
II = p[Py - cy] + (1 - p)[PdL + P´(y - dL) - cy] 
    = (pP + (1 - p) P´- c) y + (1 - p)(P- P´) dL      (2) 
which is linear in y. 
 
If y > dH, then  
II = p[PdH + P´(y – dH) - cy] + (1 - p)[PdL + P´(y - dL) - cy]  
    = (P´- c)y + p(P - P´)dH + (1 - p)(P- P´)dL    (3) 
 
P´ is the price of one unit of production if the supply level of the developer (y) 
is higher than the realized demand ( dH or  dL). We assume that the 
consequence of over-building is serious so that  P´  <  c. Under this 
circumstance, there is no incentive for the developer to build as many units as 




Period 1: Date 0 
 
Equation (2) and equation (3) provide us with the basis to calculate the 
optimal supply level of a developer. If the developer has no private 
information (that is, if the developer decides the number of units to supply to 
the market based solely on public information), then the number of units 
supplied will be a function of parameters (such as p, P, and c) and the optimal 
number of units supplied by the developer is 
L d y ‡ . Specifically, we know 
1). If pP + (1- p) P´< c, then  y = dL. 
2). If pP (1- p) P´> c  c P P > ¢ - ) 1 ( p p , then  y = dH. 
3). If pP + (1- p) P´= c, then  y can be any number between dL and dH. 
 
However, if the developer has private information and uses the private 
information to update the public information she/he receives, then the 
supplied units will be dependent upon the signal the developer receives. 
When a positive signal  G is received, the supplied units will be 
] , [ ) ( H L d d G y ˛ .  Specifically, we know 
 
1). If  c P G d p P G d p H H > ¢ - + )) ( 1 ( ) ( , then y (G) = dH. 
2) .If  c P G d p P G d p H H < ¢ - + )) ( 1 ( ) ( , then y (G) = dL. 
3). If  c P G d p P G d p H H = ¢ - + )) ( 1 ( ) ( , then y (G) can be any number between 
dL and dH. 
 
Similarly, when a negative signal  B is received, the supplied units will be 
] , [ ) ( H L d d B y ˛ . Specifically, we know 
 
1). If  c P G d p P G d p H H > ¢ - + )) ( 1 ( ) ( , then y (B) = dH. 
2) .If  c P G d p P G d p H H < ¢ - + )) ( 1 ( ) ( , then y (B) = dL. 
3). If  c P G d p P G d p H H = ¢ - + )) ( 1 ( ) ( , then y (B) can be any number between 
dL and dH. 
 
 
Period 2: Trial-Sale 
 
In our model, a developer will initiate a trial-sale before she/he decides on the 
final number of units to supply to the market. The maximum number of units 
the developer will build is dL, with or without private information. There are 100  Wang, Zhou, Chan and Chau 
   
two possible outcomes from the trial-sale: sH and sL (sH > sL). A trial-sale level 
above sH would indicate that the demand level of the period is better than dH. 
Similarly, a trial-sale level below  L s  would indicate that the demand level for 
the period is worse than dL. (We further assume that sH < dL to simplify our 
analysis.) Over-confidence occurs when the positive private information (G) 
is followed by the higher trial-sale level  sH or when the negative private 
information (B) is followed by the lower trial-sale level sL.  
 
Let  ) ( G s p L s = a  and define as as the probability that a low trial-sale level will 
be reached after a positive signal is received. In other words,  as is the 
probability that a positive private signal G will not be confirmed by a high 
trial-sale level sH. Similarly, ßs can be defined as the probability that a high 
trial-sale level will be reached after a negative signal B is received. In other 
words,  ßs is the probability that a negative private signal  B will not be 
confirmed by a low trial-sale level  sL. Since in the paper we focus on the 
consequences of over-confidence and trial-sale, without loss of generality, 
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Under this circumstance, the probabilities of having a high trial-sale level and 
low trial-sale level are both 1/2. 
 
 
Period 3: Final phase 
 
We assume that at date 0 the developer does not have overconfidence, but if 
the private information is confirmed based on a pre-specified rule (such as the 
one defined in the previous section), over-confidence occurs. After the trial-
                                                 
1 That is, we assume away the information content of the trial-sale result.  Under this 
circumstance, the sole function of the trial-sale is to confirm the developer's private 
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sale, the developer revises her/his estimate of future demand and her/his 
confidence level on the private information and then decides to build a certain 
number of housing units for the final phase, taking the amount of the trial-sale 
as inventory. 
 
Let  ) ( G d p H  and  ) ( B d p L   be the revised probabilities of the demand level 
conditional on the observed signals G and B, respectively. If we assume that 
the developer behaves rationally (and will not be over-confident about the 
precision of her/his private signal), based on the Bayes' rule, the conditional 
demand probabilities can be calculated as  
 
b p a p
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Case 1: with a confirmed private signal 
 
When a positive signal G is received and followed by a high trial-sale level sH 
(or when a negative signal B is received and followed by a low trial-sale level 
sL), then the private signal G (or private signal B) is confirmed. Under both 
circumstances, we assume that the developer will be more confident about 
her/his private information. Consequently, the developer will over-estimate 
the precision of her/his private information and reduce the probability of 
making a mistake from  a  and  ß to a  and b , respectively. Naturally, we 
assume  a <  a  and  b  <  ß. Consequently, the over-confident conditional 
demand-probabilities, or equation (7) and equation (8), can be re-written as  
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Let  p  be the price of one unit of product at the trial-sale stage and x be the 
additional units supplied after the trial-sale but before the demand is realized. 
The developer’s profit R(x, G, sH) can be specified as: 
 
(i) If dH is realized, then  
 
) ( ) ( ) , , , ( x d c s x d P s P d s G x R L H L H H H + - - + + = , if 



















+ + - =  
if
L H d d x - >   (12) 
 
(ii) If  L d  is realized, then 
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Consequently, the expected profit of the developer is 
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The first order condition of equation (14) is  
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When we assume that a developer could behave irrationally when her/his 
private information is confirmed by the trial-sale activity, the optimal supply 
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However, it should be noted that, if we assume that the developer behaves 
rationally (and will not be over-confident about her/his private information) 
even if a positive signal G is received and followed by a high trial-sale sH, the 
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It is clear that the difference between equation (16) and equation (17) is 
caused by the difference  ) ( G d p H  and  ) ( G d p H . From equation (9), we know 
that  ) ( G d p H  >  ) ( G d p H . Under this circumstance,  x (G, sH) > x(G, sH). 
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Similarly, we define  x (B, s L) as the optimal supply when the developer is 
over-confident about the precision of her/his private negative signal when 
the signal is confirmed by a low trial-sale level. However, if the developer 
behaves rationally (and will not be over-confident) about the negative signal, 
then the optimal supply level will be  x(B, s L). It should be noted that the 
difference between equation (18) and equation (19) is due to the difference 
between  ) ( B d p L  and  ) ( B d p L .  Since from equation (10) we know that 




Case II: without a confirmed private signal 
 
If a positive signal G is received and followed by a low trial-sale level sL (or 
when a negative signal B is received and followed by a high trial-sale level sH), 
                                                 
2 To ensure that over-supply always occurs and the first order condition is always satisfied, 







> .  See Wang and Zhou (2000) for a detailed 
explanation of the intuition behind this assumption. 104  Wang, Zhou, Chan and Chau 
   
then the private signal G (or private signal B) is not confirmed. Under both 
circumstances, the developer is rational about (and will not over-estimate the 
precision of) her/his private signal. Consequently, the developer will use 
probabilities  a  and  ß to update the public information she/he receives.   
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Over-Confidence and Supply Volatility 
 
We can derive rich implications  by comparing the optimal supply levels 
derived under different conditions. Specifically, we are interested to find out if 
the trial-sale system (together with the over-confidence assumption) affects 
the supply level (and the variance of the supply level) of a developer.  To 
accomplish this, we first note that expected demand and the variance of 
demand are 
  
L H d d d E ) 1 ( )
~
( p p - + =            (22) 
 
and  
     
2 ) )( 1 ( )
~
( L H d d d ar - - = p p n       (23) 
 
respectively. The expected supply y ~  when we assume that a developer will be 
over-confident about her/his private signal if the signal is confirmed by the 
trial-sale is 
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Equation (24) predicts that, with a trial-sale system, the expected supply level 
is always larger than the expected demand level. This result holds regardless 
of whether we assume that developers are over-confident or not. This 
implication provides a convincing explanation as to why the property markets 
in Asian countries seem to be more over-built than in cities in other regions of 
the world. This result also provides one more possible explanation for the 
literature on over-building.  
 
While it is not clear if over-confidence will increase or decrease a developer’s 
expected supply level, it is clear that over-confidence will cause excessive 
volatility. To see this, let dL +x ~  be the total supplied units without over-
confidence and choose model parameters properly such that E( y ~ ) = E(dL 
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Equation (25) is true because, from the definitions, we know that x (G, sH) > 
x(G, sH) > E( y ~ ) and x (B, sL) > x(G, sL) > E( y ~ ). Equation (25) indicates that 
the over-confidence of a developer will increase supply volatility in the 
market.  When a developer's estimation is confirmed by the trial-sale, the 
developer will place more and more weight on her/his own information in the 
decision-making. In other words, if the developer is optimistic about the 
market, the developer will be even more optimistic about the market if the trial-
sale activity confirms her/his original belief. Figure 1 provides an intuitive 
explanation as to why this should be the case. It should be noted that, when 
the supply variance is large, it is reasonable for us to observe large real estate 
cycles. 106  Wang, Zhou, Chan and Chau 
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More implications on the relationship between over-confidence and supply 
volatility can be obtained by assuming that there is no noise in the trial-sale 
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If we further assume that a = ß and  , 2 1 = p  then var (dL +x ~
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Equation (28) indicates that an increase in a (or ß) will lead to a lower (rather 
than a higher) supply volatility. Since the supply volatility increases as a and 
ß decrease, it indicates that as the level of over-confidence increases (that is, 
when a is replaced by a smaller a ), the supply volatility will increase. (Note 
that a  < a.) 
 
To summarize, the existence of the trial-sale will ensure that the developer 
supplies more units to the market than the estimated demand level.  When 
developers are over-confident about her/his private information, the 
increased supply variance will most probably result in a long-standing real 
estate cycle. The results of our model confirm the empirical observation that 
Asian countries with the trial-sale system tend to have a large over-supply 





In this paper we show that the pre-sale system and over-confidence of 
developers could be a reason for the observed overbuilding and cycles 
prevailing in Asian real estate markets. Numerous research have been done 
on the persistence of excess vacancy and real estate cycles since Maisel 
(1993) pointed out that real estate markets rank among the most cyclically 108  Wang, Zhou, Chan and Chau 
   
volatile industries. Our paper adds one more dimension to the possible 
causes of real estate cycles and excess vacancy, with a special application to 
certain Asian real estate markets. 
 
However, it should also be noted that, although the result of our analysis is 
based on a unique pre-sale system that is popular in Asian countries, our 
implications could be generalized to real estate markets without a trial-sale 
system. For example, in the U.S., the sale of subdivision lots is based on a 
"take down" system by builders. The number of lots taken by builders 
provides a tool for a developer to update her/his belief on the future demand 
and to revise the speed of developing the subdivision. In this regard, our 
model, with a slight modification, should also be able to explain the market 
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